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ABSTRACT 
The literature concerning firm boundaries has focussed extensively on the rationale for 
different boundary choices and the economic efficiencies that such choices can make.  There 
is also an acknowledged position that a firm’s boundary choices may impact the ability of a 
firm to maintain and even build new capabilities, though such choices may not be optimal 
from an economic efficiency perspective.  It is in this context that we seek to investigate how 
firms make this potential trade-off in respect of their boundary choices and how these choices 
are implemented across a wide range of activities. Using qualitative data from three public 
sector construction oriented organizations, we observe that neither pure make nor buy 
decisions assisted significantly in capability building.  Dual modes – where firms make and 
buy the same product or service simultaneously – provided firms with some opportunities to 
manage this paradox, but the most successful decisions seemed to occur in respect of using 
intermediate governance modes such as alliances.  We also observed that the boundary choice 
was just one dimension of the capability building process and firms pursuing the same 
boundary choice decisions often had quite divergent outcomes on the basis of their boundary 
management and the ability of knowledge to move across firm boundaries. 
 
Page1 
 
THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARIES ON (RE)BUILDING 
CAPABILITIES 
 
The location of firm boundaries has captured the interest of scholars for over 30 years.  
The focus of this research has been on understanding where a firm should draw its 
organizational boundaries with an emphasis on efficiency.  However, a firm’s boundaries are 
inextricably linked to its capabilities – both at present, as well as how these may develop over 
time.  Thus a firm’s boundary choices may be a source of competitive advantage from two 
vantage points: firstly on the basis of the right choices concerning choices for activities in 
respect of their fulfilment via the market or hierarchy may provide economic benefits, but 
secondly, such choices may allow for the development of firm capabilities on the basis of the 
learning that may provide a basis for competitive advantage from a resources or capabilities 
perspective (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). It is the potential for 
firms to make boundary choice decisions that are less than optimal in respect of economic 
efficiency as a means to build new capabilities that creates a potential paradox for firms and 
we therefore seek to investigate how firms make such choices (including the trade-offs they 
make) along with how they implement these choices in their day to day activities and the 
impact these choices had upon the actual development of new capabilities. 
We present four possible boundary choices – make, buy, intermediate governance 
modes and dual governance modes.  Existing literature provides a rationale for such choices 
and the impact that the discrete choices have upon capability development (Jacobides & 
Winter, 2005; Makadok & Coff, 2009; Parmiagini, 2007). We use this literature as a starting 
point for observing the various choices select organizations make in respect of their 
boundaries both from an efficiency and a capability perspective, along with the actual 
management of these firm boundaries over time. 
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In respect of our empirical setting, the emergence of New Public Management (Pollitt 
& Bouckaert 2000, English 2005, English & Skellern 2005) has seen government agencies 
pull back their corporate boundaries through outsourcing and divestment of core activities 
(Young 2007). Agencies that have previously been tasked with construction activities as an 
example, no longer complete any construction and instead manage a plethora of contractors. 
In some cases, the outcome is a misalignment between an organisation’s capabilities and the 
agency’s mandate. At a practical level the result has been a number of failed projects and 
select agencies have been tasked with increasing their capabilities significantly. It is against 
this backdrop of (re)building organisational capabilities whilst maintaining high levels of 
efficiency that this paper addresses how the setting of organizational boundaries has impacted 
the capability development process in select organizations. 
 
FIRM BOUNDARIES, CAPABILITIES AND LEARNING 
Explanations for the location of firm boundaries have emerged from a variety of perspectives 
including seminal organizational theory that focused on the coordination of tasks and 
activities (Katz & Kahn 1966; Lawrence & Lorsch 1967; Thompson 1967), to theories of 
economic organisation focused on property rights and transaction costs (Alchian & Demsetz 
1972; Grossman & Hart 1986; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Williamson 1975), and strategic 
theories of resources, capabilities and knowledge (Barney 1995; Foss 2002; McGee 2003; 
Teece, Pisano & Shuen 1997). Contemporary research is dominated by two broad 
conversations. The first one is informed by Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) and is 
primarily concerned with the vertical scope of the firm: where to draw organizational 
boundaries in order to minimise costs at a given time point. The second conversation is 
informed by contemporary strategic theories of capabilities, knowledge, and learning and 
investigates the consequences of boundary choices for the development of strategic 
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capabilities and organizational learning. In this section we present a review of the salient 
elements of each of these two research traditions. 
Transaction cost economics presently dominate explanations concerning firms’ 
vertical scope. Whenever the combined costs of internal production and coordination are less 
than the suppliers’ cost of production plus the corresponding transaction costs, firms should 
perform activities in-house (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985). Although not consistent 
in all aspects of the TCE framework, recent meta-analytic studies (David & Han, 2004; 
Geyskens et al., 2006) provide support for the main effects, i.e. that asset specificity and 
uncertainty promote internal production. What TCE does not do is to address the role of 
relative advantages that some firms have over others in respect of particular stages in the 
value chain (Jacobides & Hitt, 2005) and nor does it provide a basis for a holistic 
understanding of the dynamics of the firm as an entity and how it engages with the broader 
industry architecture (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Christensen, Raynor & Verlinden, 2001) 
given the unit of analysis is the transaction. 
Taking an alternative line of enquiry to TCE, Argyres (1996) provided the initial 
empirical evidence that firm-level capabilities fundamentally affected the boundary choices 
made by firms.  Subsequent research via a capability-oriented lens highlighted how boundary 
scope decisions are driven by capability heterogeneity across firms (e.g. Argyres & 
Liebeskind, 1999; Madhok, 2002; Schilling & Steensma, 2002; Leiblein & Miller, 2003; 
Hoetker, 2005). The heterogeneous capability distribution across firms in an industry 
provides opportunities for gains from trade.  Firms engage in transactions if they expect a net 
benefit from interacting with the market. As long as some firms are more efficient in 
performing certain activities in a value chain, then transaction costs allowing, contracting out 
will result in a net benefit for both the supplier and the buyer. It is worth noting that firms not 
necessarily only contract with the “best in-class”-supplier. Rather, in order to constitute a net 
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benefit from the transaction it is sufficient that the supplier firm has a comparative advantage 
relative to what the buying firm can complete the same activity for in-house.  The result is a 
firm’s capabilities relative to those held by other firms (and thus determining the potential for 
gains from trade) will fundamentally affect a firm’s boundaries (Jacobides & Winter, 2005). 
Thus, the two perspectives provide a theoretical rationale for a variety of boundary choices – 
make, buy, ally (intermediate or hybrid governance modes) and dual (or plural) governance 
modes. We discuss these four choices in turn and draw out the implications of each choice for 
capability development and learning.  
Buy 
TCE and strategic theories suggest that when external suppliers have a comparative cost 
advantage, provided that there is no major threat of holdup, then the firm should buy in the 
goods or services considered, rather than attempt to perform the activity in-house 
(Williamson, 1975; Barney, 1991). Expressed in this way, boundary decisions are driven by 
what the firm considers is core business (Hagel & Singer, 1999; Prahalad &Hamel, 1990). 
However, to reduce a firm’s scope through replacing a make decision with a buy decision is 
likely over time to see a firm’s capability in a particular area wither as employees leave over 
time and the routine is eliminated from a firm’s activities (Collis, 1994). The firm may retain 
an element of the capability over time provided the relevant employees remain with the firm, 
but it will weaken significantly in due course as structures change, cultures adapt and critical 
employees leave the firm (Grant, 1996a).  
The corollary to gains from trade is gains from specialization and these are likely to 
limit the efforts a firm makes to build capabilities for an activity it has decided should occur 
outside of its boundaries. However, a firm moving into an entirely new activity may still find 
opportunities for learning even if it uses a buy option. There may be some limited knowledge 
leakage (Hamel, 1991; Inkpen, 2005), and whilst it’s productive capabilities may not change, 
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at a minimum, the firm should learn about existing industry standards, technology and 
appropriate pricing of the activity – especially if more than one supplier is used. In fact, it is 
the need to minimize the risk of cheating that encourages firms to at least learn about various 
dimensions of the market. 
Make 
Conversely, firms should undertake in-house activities that are considered to be core 
business, where the firm has a comparative cost advantage, or there exists a material risk of 
holdup (Williamson, 1975, Barney, 1991, Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). 
The expansion of a firm’s scope will see new routines established and new 
capabilities developed over time. The make option provides firms with classic in-firm 
learning opportunities akin to what Henderson (1984) describes in respect of the experience 
curve. Capabilities are continually developed within the firm as per Argyres’ (1996:143) 
study of a cable producer – “know-how is held as trade secrets, and has been developed from 
longer experience than competitors in experimenting with the many combinations of 
parameters of the process”. It is possible that through pursuing a ‘make’ strategy for a 
particular activity that the firm may put itself at a disadvantage through not pursuing the 
gains from trade available through contracting with a more efficient provider in the market, 
however, there may be legitimate reasons for seeking to develop their capabilities in respect 
of this activity.1 
Intermediate Governance Modes 
The intermediate governance mode or network sees a firm use a combination of incentives to 
govern a particular transaction with a single economic actor (Makadok & Coff, 2009; 
Williamson, 1991).  Between markets and hierarchies, intermediate modes differs from dual 
                                                          
1 A firm may make a strategic decision to participate in an industry in the long-term, even though it is starting 
from a position of weakness. However, more commonly, they may not be able to buy due to the cost of 
integrating the market standard in their own production system. Described by Schilling (2000) in her general 
modular systems theory, products or services with synergistic specificity may be able to provide benefits not 
available to modular system, but they achieve this by limiting the degree of recombinability. 
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modes in that it refers to a single transaction where the product or service is produced via a 
strategic alliance or similar.  In comparison, dual modes see the ‘pure’ modes of hierarchies 
and markets applied to different transactions, but for the same activity2. Whilst alliances and 
other intermediate modes may be used for a variety of reasons, there is considerable literature 
concerning how alliances can lead to knowledge transfer and learning (Hamel, 1991; Inkpen, 
2005). Firms may explicitly engage in alliance activity for the purposes of knowledge 
transfer.  But beyond any planned knowledge sharing, there is always a degree of knowledge 
spillovers such that even with contractual safeguards and measures to limit opportunistic 
behaviour, interconnected firms will generally experience greater erosion of rents owing to 
imitation (Lavie, 2006, p.649) and as such, by forming alliances, interconnected firms with 
good fortune can gain access to resources without paying full acquisition costs.  
The importance of knowledge and its capacity to move across organizational 
boundaries is perhaps most clearly picked up by strategic theories focused on knowledge and 
learning which provides a clear rationale for the existence of alliances as an economically 
efficient governance mode (Grant, 1996b). As there is never a perfect congruence between 
the activity boundaries of the firm and the knowledge boundaries of the firm, opportunities 
exist for alliances or other forms of intermediate governance modes. The suggested 
implication is increasing cooperation with other organisations to engage in activities and 
access resources, including knowledge, outside their own boundaries (Grant & Baden-Fuller 
2004). However, strategic theories of capabilities and knowledge do not address how the 
knowledge actually flows between organisations and instead implicitly treat knowledge like 
other tradeable assets without delving into the practical complexities of transferring 
knowledge across organisational boundaries (Grant 1996b; Grant & Baden-Fuller 2004). 
Dual Governance Modes 
                                                          
2  Makadok and Coff (2009) also distinguish intermediate modes from hybrids in that hybrids are market like in 
some dimensions (ownership, rewards and authority), but hierarchy like in others. 
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Since Harrigan’s (1984) work on taper integration, it has been recognized that firms do in fact 
use dual governance modes whereby they simultaneously ‘make’ and ‘buy’ (concurrent 
sourcing) and ‘make’ and ‘sell’ (concurrent exploitation) the same product or service 
simultaneously. These dual modes or situations where the firm is said to have permeable 
boundaries (Jacobides & Billinger, 2006) are independent and stable choices (as opposed to 
transitory phenomena) that enable a firm to utilize both the market and hierarchy 
simultaneously.  The existence of dual modes cannot be explained using traditional 
Williamsonian TCE principles and thus alternative explanations exist that move away from 
transaction-level efficiency oriented arguments and instead include explanations such as 
learning and capability development (Fixon & Park, 2008; Jacobides & Billiniger, 2006; 
Parmigiani, 2007; Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009). 
Dual modes provide firms with learning opportunities from both their own activities 
and suppliers/buyers.  In addition to experience curve effects regarding internal production, 
the firm’s knowledge about the technological standards builds potential absorptive capacity 
(Jansen, van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2005).  As reported by Parmigiani (2007), firms use 
concurrent sourcing to learn from suppliers and to understand and interpret the market 
(particularly in cases of technological uncertainty).  Hence, by knowing about both their own 
strengths as well as changes in productive capabilities available on the market, firms will 
learn which activities do provide the best opportunities for further gains from specialization. 
“Concurrent sourcing opens the firm to learning arising from the spillovers from related 
components and different production methods of the firm and its suppliers” (Parmigiani & 
Mitchell, 2009: 1067). Over time, the changes in the capability distribution within the 
industry also provide feedback regarding the appropriateness of their relationship with 
suppliers – “firms need to make in order to know … [but] firms do not need to make all of 
their components to know enough to outsource” (Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009: 1067).   
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A review of the firm boundary literature provides us with a range of options in respect 
of how firms may set their governance modes and the impact that this may have upon 
capability development.  Whilst the buy option is unlikely to provide much in the way of 
learning opportunities, there is significant potential to build capabilities through the boundary 
choices of make, dual governance and intermediate governance modes. In the following 
sections we seek to detail how three organizations sought to (re)build capabilities in respect 
of the boundary choices they made and the actual impact these decisions had upon the 
organizations. 
 
METHODS, DATA AND CONTEXT 
This research involves three case studies of Australian government organizations.  These 
organizations – the West Australian Department of Housing and Works (WADHW), the 
Main Roads Department of Western Australia (MRWA) and the Queensland Department of 
Main Roads (QMR) – are all involved in the building and maintenance of major 
infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges and tunnels in the case of the roads specific 
departments, and hospitals, jails and major government buildings for the ‘works’ department. 
As outlined in each case study below, these organizations have witnessed a significant shift in 
the location of their boundaries and in two cases, major reports have recommended that they 
need to rebuild relevant capabilities following the review of a number of projects. These 
organizations were chosen specifically as they have each taken a somewhat different pathway 
in respect of how they manage their boundaries in their attempt build appropriate capabilities 
for the future. 
In order to build case studies from research data, a qualitative approach was used, as it 
allowed us insight into the shared organizational knowledge and every day actions and 
interactions of staff in the organizations being studied (Miller, Dingwall & Murphy, 2004). 
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Furthermore, qualitative research is flexible enough to deal with unanticipated factors which 
emerge and to provide organizations with information that they would not have anticipated 
was relevant (Miller, Dingwall & Murphy, 2004). 
Primary sources of data were 34 interviews (minimum of ten per organization) of 
approximately one hour with key internal and external stakeholders (suppliers/contractors). 
Further, supplementary data came from secondary data sources including websites, annual 
reports, strategic documentation and procedures and were used as background information 
and as support for mapping processes and relationships. All interviews occurred in 2008 and 
initial results were presented to each organization via workshops in 2009.  Where necessary, 
additional information was obtained following these workshops in 2009.  To ensure that we 
had not misinterpreted any of the material, we presented detailed reports concerning all of our 
analysis and our finding to each organization in draft form in 2009 and our final reports in 
2010.  
To ensure that we spoke to the most appropriate people, the project sponsors in each 
organization recommended various employees as well as recommending different 
contractors/suppliers.  This purposive sampling of participants enabled us to gain a variety of 
perspectives on some of the most relevant processes and thus yield rich data for the 
development of the case studies (Cresswell, 2002). Following the initial interviews, we 
immediately started analyzing data and based decisions about what data to collect next on this 
analysis, thus providing valuable clues about missing data and shaping theoretical sampling 
(Miller, Dingwall & Murphy, 2004). We coded for processes, actions, assumptions and 
consequences rather than for topics which generated greater analytical precision (Charmaz, 
1990, Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
The resulting cases provide the rich data (Siggelkow, 2007; Weick, 2007) required to 
understand the second order complexity of knowledge processes which are contextualised in 
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social and cultural experiences (Tywoniak 2007a). The choice of three comparable, rich case 
studies gives us interesting insights into the experiences of those in organizations that are 
seeking to rebuild their capabilities through purposeful boundary choices. While the 
methodological intention is to capture the richness that comes with detailed case studies, Yin 
(1994) suggests that the description and analysis of such cases has the ability to convey 
information about a more general phenomenon by calling attention to issues and by 
highlighting discrepancies between theory and practice. 
 
CASE STUDIES 
Department of Housing and Works (WA) 
Of the three organizations that formed part of this research, DHW had undergone the most 
significant changes. It had evolved from the original Department of Works in Western 
Australia and had been responsible for building much of the major government infrastructure 
for the better part of two centuries. Starting in the 1980s, there was a shift towards greater 
outsourcing. Different parts of the organisation were shifted to other agencies and there was 
an almost continual move towards greater levels of outsourcing. The name of the 
organization changed on a number of occasions to better reflect the focus of the organisation 
such that it was the Building Management Authority before it became the Contract and 
Management Services Department and then following the reintegration of some functions 
including the Government Architect and the Housing Department it was renamed again to 
become the Department of Housing and Works. 
“We are still evolving and haven’t [quite] found the appropriate managerial control 
for a Public Works agency in a post colonial era because that’s where we are I guess.  The 
colonial era extended up until the mid-1980s because it’s only in a colonial environment 
where there’s insufficient depth in the private sector expertise and you have to have a strong 
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government expert… Once you’ve got a fully developed private sector and good 
communications they can have an international firm with expertise … in airports, hospitals 
[etc].  You can actually derive enough expertise from the private sector.  So I guess … where 
is the border-line? ... I’ve advocated for a greater degree of expertise...  But it’s a very 
variable picture throughout different government administrations all over the world as to 
what is your core expertise and what isn’t.” 
At present, the DHW primarily manages contracts. Other government departments 
form the client base such that when the Department of Education needs a new school or the 
Health Department has funding to build a new hospital, they use DHW to manage the entire 
process.  DHW then outsources the vast majority of the activities associated with the design, 
project management and building of the required infrastructure. 
Following some notable problems in some high profile buildings and a change in 
government, DHW implemented a ‘Review and Rebuild’ strategy in 2008.  It was recognized 
that the organization was losing a significant portion of its corporate knowledge each year as 
highly skilled long-serving employees retired. Often these employees had come from a 
technical background, the fact that they might have initially entered the organization as an 
architect or an engineer meant that they had a capacity to work with contractors and sort out 
issues before they became problems. Without this background, many more recent employees 
are administrators and are unable to take any pre-emptive action as they cannot recognize 
problems as they arise and rely on either the contractor to tell them or for the issue to escalate 
to the point where it becomes obvious. 
There are a number of strands to the ‘Review and Rebuild’ strategy. Significant 
efforts have been made to work with other public sector agencies such as the Department of 
Planning and Infrastructure and MRWA. This includes formal processes such as the creation 
of a central Office of Strategic Projects to assist with major projects (such as a new teaching 
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hospital) and more informal processes such as monthly Wednesday afternoon presentations 
and networking events for relevant project managers. Within DHW there have also been 
formal processes to enhance knowledge transfer such as starting with formal inductions and 
also including workshops and training. One of the most significant outcomes of these 
processes is an understanding by staff as to who (or where) to go to for certain information – 
“They learnt to ask a lot of questions.  Run around the place, who do I ask about this and 
that?  Pretty frustrating exercise, but the information’s there if they ask the right people.  I 
mean people are pretty supportive about answering those sort of questions.” 
There has been little in the way of changing the boundaries of the organization with 
the vast majority of activities directly relating to designing and building completed by 
contractors. There are some limited efforts to bring some of the preliminary or 
complementary work back in-house.  For example, in respect of meeting certain sustainability 
targets, DHW is doing a small amount of the work and using consultants on more specialized 
projects. This is also being tried in other preliminary design related activities – 
“Sustainability is one area we are putting in some effort, but there’s many other facets of 
design that we’re not able to put the same effort of resources in and so there are large gaps.  
Heritage has been variable, but it’s less well resourced, also it’s a specialised area.  Then 
there’s everything, remediation, pollution, are all related to sites and … there is no 
expertise”. 
There have been significant attempts to learn from contractors as part of the ‘Review 
and Rebuild’ strategy such as the introduction of much more detailed project reviews. These 
however, have been fairly unsuccessful at helping to build organizational knowledge.  First, 
little real effort was put into the reviews with people customising them as they see fit – 
“Because you allow that customisation, I guess you then get different firms, and different 
project managers, who have a different perspective on what they want, and what they 
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expect”. Secondly, the pace of work is such that there is little time for reflection and 
subsequent action – “People don’t do a job and then start the next one... they’ve always got 
six, or eight, or ten on the run at once”. In addition, employees tend to work individually on 
projects so they have little opportunity to learn from other projects unless a formal evaluation 
review is shared amongst a larger group – “each project manager is basically his own little 
island and his or her team … is [the] external consultant team they have for the project and 
the contractor”. 
The other key reason why so little knowledge is assimilated by DHW from their 
various contracting efforts is the actual nature of the contracts used. The principal 
determinant for selecting a contractor is the price – “So there’s a lot of pressure on us, 
generally speaking, to bottom trawl, to have the cheapest price”. Contractors submit tenders 
that include virtually no margin and work on the (commonly correct) assumption that there 
will be some change in scope or specifications for which they will be able to invoice 
separately and this is where they will make their margin. The result is that there is simply no 
organizational slack such that contractors can spend time working with DHW in a way that 
will help them rebuild some capabilities.  In fact, this focus on the cheapest price and then the 
contractor trying to create some margin in the project at some point creates rather adversarial 
relationship – “Contracting is … adversarial by nature. If we strengthen our relationships 
[through sharing information] it can break down the adversarial nature of the contracts 
because you have this stronger relationship there.  It won’t get rid of it, it’s just a harsh 
reality of life but I think it will significantly reduce the level of conflict or dispute that we do 
have”. 
Whilst some staff suggested that there was a need to move towards true alliance 
contracts, the most significant step taken has been to use some multi-decision criteria for 
major projects that move away from focussing so heavily on price – “It’s helped an enormous 
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amount to have the Government Architect being able to select a design consultant on the 
merits of his or her design approach.  That’s taken us a long way ... in the right direction”. 
However, overall, the general feeling amongst staff and contractors is that very little has 
really changed under the ‘Review and Rebuild’ strategy: 
“Rebuilding is the whole essence of this, rebuilding expertise capacity in an 
environment where essentially often lip service is paid to rebuilding a public service entity ... 
you get a whole number of institutional blockages to actually being able to rebuild expertise.  
The boom in the construction sector hasn’t helped but there’s been very little readiness of 
government to actually do anything more than pay lip service to rebuilding expertise”. 
 
Queensland Department of Main Roads (QMR) 
Of all the states in Australia, Queensland has been the least aggressive in pursuing out-
sourcing amongst its various government agencies. They have been slow to follow this global 
trend and as a result are envied by agencies across many other states due to their ability to 
still take a lead role in a variety of standards or process related discussions with industry 
bodies.  For example, in respect of asphalt and key stakeholders such as the Asphalt 
Pavement Association and other agencies responsible for roads it was commented – “We’ve 
got a couple of, probably world experts in different parts of this, so we’re very 
knowledgeable and we’re fortunate to be that way.  So we think we’re quite competent to do 
that, and we’re probably leaders in Australia in terms of that knowledge”. 
Nevertheless, there has been a significant shift in the design of the organization with 
the construction component being corporatized (ie they were structured to operate in a 
manner similar to a commercial firm and to pay a dividend to the government).  This shift 
started in the 1980’s when QMR began to initiate a change in their structure to split the 
department into two sections: Main Roads (QMR) and RoadTek. QMR is responsible for 
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much of the design and recording of standards and specifications which they maintain 
through a comprehensive set of manuals. RoadTek is responsible for the physical building of 
the projects and contract themselves back to QMR. Employees were allocated a division in 
which to work. “They just drew a line down the middle and said you’re going to that side and 
you’re going to that side”.  With RoadTek performing in a contractual nature to produce the 
physical work for QMR, it may have increased the number of employees required to perform 
the tasks than were previously needed when QMR covered both elements of the operations – 
“So not many people became redundant because what happened was the people who did the 
actual physical digging holes type work went to RoadTek where they stayed and then 
contracted themselves back to the department.  In some ways it duplicated the number of 
people that we needed to have rather than halved”.  
RoadTek may operate under a different name and in a more commercial manner than 
when construction was undertaken entirely within QMR, but it would be difficult to suggest 
that it is really separate from QMR – it is more akin to a division of a larger organization – 
“We’ve got an obligation to ensure that the commercial business unit [RoadTek] that 
undertakes construction work is gainfully employed.  We ensure that our program is 
undertaken on a sole invitee basis with ... RoadTek, and we have standard contract processes 
and negotiation processes we follow with them to negotiate a best value approach to delivery 
of the project.  So we’re working very closely with fellow Main Roads people but working in 
the commercial business unit – an arm of the department”. 
Even with this arrangement, over the last two decades more and more work has been 
outsourced to private contractors – “We used to do a large percentage of the work in house.  
We had a very large construction arm, and we put stuff out to contract as well.  But it’s 
shifted, it might be, I don’t know, the 80/20 rule I suppose.  We did 80%, 20%.  Now it’s more 
like we do 20% and that’s 80%, because we do have a construction arm, but it’s not that big 
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in comparison with the outsource work, and so there’s this big shift, and before you had all 
this knowledge because you were doing all the work”. 
One of QMR’s core functions is to maintain the standards and specifications manuals 
that determine the conditions of producing roadwork in Queensland. This process attracts 
individual funding. The manuals are used by local government and contractors. “The usage 
of them (manuals) really it is essentially done for any of the road works under our control.  
Now having said that, Local Governments use it, some private people use it for their own 
purposes as well as our construction contractors and our designers, planners, sometimes 
even the financial people”.  
The authorship of the manuals is mainly performed by QMR employees. However, 
some of this work is also outsourced. “So those technical authors tend to be technical experts 
across Main Roads.  Sometimes when documents sort of get a bit lost in that system or 
there’s maybe some technical authors that are too busy to contribute much we may outsource 
some of the writing of some of those clauses to contractors”. This outsourcing is not having a 
major impact at this point, but it is well recognized that this has potential longer-term 
implication – “I’ve got another project where I’m reformatting all the ... performance 
specifications.  I’d love to do the research for that.  I’ve had to subcontract that out to 
someone else too, so I won’t have the advantage of reading all that stuff”. Parts of the 
organization recognize this problem and where they feel their capacity to contribute in an 
area is being degraded, they make a strategic decision to do some projects internally – “Well 
the idea was ... that we could learn.  At the moment, we develop standards and manuals for 
road planning and design say, but we don’t do it routinely, and it’s been the amount of that 
work we’ve been doing has been decreasing, and so the idea of bringing this project on is to 
get some hands on experience on the application of the standards we’re writing, so we can 
feed that back into our standards”. 
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New knowledge is also being generated through R&D – “we also have some R&D 
going on so in terms of that and work so any advances that happen in that regard get fed into 
the documents”.  At present, this research is not always well integrated back into operations – 
“You’re stuffing innovation in here but nothing’s coming out the other end  ... If you haven’t 
got that feedback, it’s broken”. 
The knowledge that is created through the projects and the research is then shared and 
eventually forms the basis for enhanced capabilities through a number of mechanisms.  There 
are formal communities of practice which have been very successful, smaller technical 
forums and an annual technology transfer forum held in Brisbane annually for participants 
from all the regions. There are also structures and systems in place such as always trying to 
puts pairs of people or groups of three on a project, structured mentoring programs and the 
creation of a culture where people are very happy to share information. 
There is far less success with building capabilities in respect of outsourced work.  
With respect to big projects there are formal systems in place – “... there are formal meetings 
with the representatives; it’s all documented in minutes”.  The problem is that this tends not 
to be internalized – “...here’s the explicit knowledge, and here’s the tacit knowledge and then 
how do we bring it into, so it becomes tacit knowledge, you know, for others and passing it 
on.  So we’ve got to be thinking about how do we pass on information, not plonking it 
somewhere, and that’s what we do – we put it somewhere and then expect people to go and 
find it for themselves”.  There are no less problems in respect of the smaller projects – “We 
probably have 40 or 50 smaller projects a year, that are being delivered and those learnings 
are a bit more difficult to capture in a systematic way.  Various attempts over the years have 
been tried, but they to just lose steam”. 
There are some exceptions to this where due to the relationships in place there are 
meaningful learnings emerging out of the work done by the private contractors – “I was at a 
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learnings workshop a couple of weeks ago for a very large project and all of the presenters, 
or bar one or two, were private industry people, and they had an attitude of sharing that even 
with their competitors.  They’re not sharing financial commercial in confidence information 
... it [could] be just a simple technical construction issue or a design issue or it can be 
something much broader in how we, what we learn from the selection process to choosing a 
contractor, or how we set up the contract or some other issues and broader environmental 
issues, how we dealt with planning”. 
While there is some learning via the contractors, it is generally a poor substitute for on 
the job experience – “The difficulty is now when graduates come in ...  they don’t have access 
to building anything anymore.  They don’t get to go and sit with the foreman.  The best that 
they can do is be a site engineer with an inspector and they get to stand on the edge of the 
whole and look at what the contractor is doing and say to the inspector “psst why are they 
doing it that way?” and the inspector will go ‘because he’s a d**khead, they should be doing 
it some other way, it should be done this way’ and stuff”. 
Main Roads Western Australia (MRWA) 
Established in 1926, MRWA is the Western Australia’s statutory road authority directly 
responsible for 17,706 kilometres of roads and also contributing to assist in the maintenance 
of 125,968 kilometres of local roads. Up until the 1980s Main Roads had total control over 
the design and construction of roads. While as much as 60 percent of work was handled by 
contractors, the organisation continued to employ a huge internal labour work force. In 1996, 
Main Roads began a metamorphosis from maker and maintainer of roads to owner and 
manager under the State Government’s economic rationalist reform agenda. The rapid 
refocusing on outsourcing to the private sector resulted in severe staff reductions. In 2001 a 
Ministerial report recognized that this has severely compromised MRWA’s capacity to 
operate and recommended that Main Roads rebuild about 25 percent of its in-house design 
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capacity, so that it was not just an ‘informed buyer’, but a partner in the State road industry. 
This paved the way for a move towards relationship contracting and particularly alliancing. A 
new Commissioner was hired who brought with him a wealth of contracting experience and 
knowledge about relationship contracting and in a little under three years from the influential 
report, MRWA entered its first (rather prescriptive) alliance contract.  
Before covering the alliance contacts used, it is worth noting that the majority of work 
done by MRWA is still smaller scale projects that are either completed in-house in respect of 
establishing standards or are outsourced and a project manager oversees them from the 
perspective of MRWA. Similar to the previous two cases, the extent to which there is any 
learning from the contractor very much depends upon the relationship that exists. Learning 
has occurred in cases where “... long term relationships are there, consultants that we deal 
with we know very well”, however, it was also commented that the majority of contracts (such 
as Design and Construct contracts) are not very successful as “they become very adversarial”. 
Even if new knowledge is created through the internal operations or if it enters the 
organization via a contractor’s activities – possibly through the review process – it rarely 
becomes assimilated to the point that new capabilities are created or existing capabilities 
enhanced. The single project manager is simply not able to effectively integrate it into the 
wider system. “We’ve tried newsletters many times that don’t appear to have a hell of a lot of 
success, we had a thing called a team brief in place which was a shower of information from 
top to bottom … A lot of people are not good at you know the personal skill of just talking to 
a group of 10 to 15 people – they don’t like it at all”. 
In comparison, alliance contracts – which apply to the largest of contracts – seem to 
be considerably more successful. The awarding of alliance contracts are based on multiple 
criteria including the reputation of the alliance partners rather than being based entirely upon 
cost. Even the final cost is often not determined until after the contract has been signed and 
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preliminary design work is completed (though there is always an accepted formula or system 
for determining the eventual cost that is agreed to in advance). In essence, a key driver for 
MRWA is to build the best possible roads for the community and they seek alliance partners 
who can bring innovation to each project (Edmonds 2007). While alliances are primarily 
risk/reward-sharing arrangements, they afford the opportunity for both public and private 
partners to engage in projects larger than any one entity would be able to undertake on their 
own. Thus alliances provide a capacity building potential for all individuals and organizations 
involved that is not inherent in conventional contracting arrangements. In addition, alliance 
partners have to complete all land resumptions, approvals, heritage considerations and 
stakeholder relations, formerly dealt with by Main Roads ahead of the awarding a contract. 
These processes now run concurrently, thus speeding up the process. “For everyone this is a 
new way of working and we probably didn’t appreciate the risk and time associated with 
what Main Roads does before they award a traditional contract.”  
At the start of each project, an independent alliance facilitator works with the alliance 
management team to determine goals, including a commitment that everyone will exit the 
alliance with enhanced knowledge and skills. This process involves establishing explicit non-
cost key performance indicators, which are measured and rewarded by the client as part of the 
contract. These include training and the development of individual training plans. Thus there 
is a clearly articulated learning agenda. Said a project director: “The sharing of knowledge is 
a two way street and no one is bleeding off anyone else. While I have enhanced my 
knowledge of design and geotechnical issues, I know that the Main Roads guys have a better 
understanding of contracting issues. Although there is a contract in place, things are very 
different from a conventional contract in that we negotiate better outcomes and there is a 
different mindset”. 
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Alliance partners agree that the biggest challenge in establishing an alliance 
partnership is bringing people from different organisations together to think as one. The 
alliance facilitator supports much of the team development process and the establishment of 
common values. “Team development is essential for future success. Because of the different 
cultures it has been a battle from day one to build a team and we have had to constantly work 
on our team culture and development. We have tried to get people out of their huddles and 
focused on creating a new team with a unique identity”. Another key issue is that alliance 
contractors may require the use of key personal for many years and employees are not 
replaced in MRWA while they are working away from the department on the alliance 
contract. However involvement in an alliance contract is an invaluable source of knowledge 
for the employee and the department – “The learning has been huge… and importantly we are 
documenting everything we do and feeding that back into Main Roads”.   
When alliance members return to the parent organisation they take with them 
invaluable knowledge not only about the practice of constructing a particular road, but also 
about the way that alliance partners think and the collaborative, problem solving processes 
involved to achieve the outcome. Main Roads alliance members indicate that they closely 
document the contracting award process, all other processes and lessons learnt at each critical 
milestone. Specific interventions throughout the project are also documented and all this 
detail is fed back into Main Roads. Documenting the alliance experience embellishes 
knowledge which flows back to the organisation through other conduits like formal reporting, 
designs and the Technical Advisory Group. People entering new alliances have described the 
knowledge gleaned from the documented processes of previous alliances as invaluable. Many 
employees see the exchange of ideas, the flexibility to resolve differences of opinion and 
innovate in the open environment of the alliance as a very healthy way of building 
knowledge. This is particularly because effective feedback loops are being developed and this 
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new knowledge challenges existing, traditional thinking within the parent organization. 
However, some employees are still skeptical about whether these feedback loops are effective 
fearing that much of the knowledge is still in people’s heads and not captured in systems. 
They suggest the need for conversations which capture not only the lessons learnt, but also 
the stories that go to make up experience. Certainly the lessons learnt from each alliance are 
supporting the development of future alliances. Employees involved with developing and 
implementing design standards see great benefits flowing back to their team.  
Main Roads employees have a range of opinions about the effectiveness of alliancing 
and views differ depending on whether or not people have been involved in an alliance. One 
Main Roads alliance said “I didn’t think that the knowledge and skills transfer would work 
the way people told me it would, but I have learnt a huge amount about how contractors work 
and I have taught the contractors about how Main Roads works and there has been an 
enormous transfer of knowledge”.  
DISCUSSION 
The three case studies discussed do not present pure and discrete cases of different boundary 
decision choices.  However, many of the decisions were unique and provide a very useful 
starting point for better understanding the choices organizations make in respect of their 
boundaries, how they operationalize these choices and the impact they have upon the 
organization. 
DHW was dominated by discrete make or buy choices with more and more of the 
organizational activities being outsourced to the market. With no discernible specialized 
assets in place and limited potential for opportunism on the part of contractors, the boundary 
choices made by DHW are understandable.  
What is changing is the ability for DHW to establish and monitor contracts effectively 
as they lose knowledgeable staff and this diminishing capability to establish and oversee 
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major contracts created the impetus for their ‘Review and Rebuild’ strategy. This strategy did 
not include fundamental changes in their boundary choices. Markets continue to be used 
extensively – competition was very price driven in most cases and past relationships had no 
impact upon the selection of contractor. Internally, DHW continued to manage contracts.  
Where DHW made some attempts to learn from contractors in respect of the structure and 
content of contracts and the projects they apply to, these attempts were largely unsuccessful.  
The focus on price limited the amount of slack in the contract which might otherwise enable 
the contractor to work with DHW in a manner that allowed for more communication and 
interaction to support learning; there was limited feedback and reflection at the conclusion of 
a contract and the fact that contract managers work individually limit the extent to which any 
new knowledge can be shared effectively. It is not unsurprising that the use of markets was 
unable to form the basis of any new capability development as existing literature suggests 
that any learning will be limited to understanding the structure of the market, how it 
interfaces with the organization and the price for particular goods and services. 
In comparison, the make strategy does provide opportunities for learning and the 
development of capabilities. What we saw in DHW was not so much the creation of new 
capabilities, but rather the maintenance of an existing set of capabilities in the face of 
considerable staff retirement along with standard organizational turn-over. Many of the 
initiatives to come out of the ‘Review and Rebuild’ strategy focused upon ensuring that some 
of the knowledge and skills of long-term staff were assimilated by newer staff. The only real 
change in respect of boundary choices was an attempt to complete more of the preliminary 
work such as sustainability, heritage and environment reports internally. New staff had been 
hired in the area of sustainability, but without existing structures and processes, the general 
feeling was that there was still some way to go before DHW would be anywhere near 
possessing the type of capabilities in this area that the consultants they presently use offer. In 
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essence, expanding the firm boundaries and bringing an activity into the organization does 
not suddenly (or even slowly) guarantee new capabilities. Given time and support, DHW will 
develop in this area, but in the short-term, they are missing an opportunity to benefit from the 
potential gains from trade. 
QMR also pursued a make choice for some activities and a buy choice for others. Our 
interest in QMR extended however to where they used dual modes. Given the lack of clear 
and well-accepted theoretical explanations for the existence of dual modes, it was not obvious 
as to why QMR followed such a strategy is respect of their boundary management.  The most 
likely explanations from the earlier discussion are likely to center on the information 
asymmetries (Heide, 2003), performance uncertainity given the complex nature of some of 
the products and services required (Coles & Hesterly, 1998; Novak & Eppinger, 2001), and 
to provide opportunities to learn (Parmigiani, 2007).  
Since the 1980s a variety of activities have gone from being 20% outsourced to 80% 
outsourced, but the key point from a boundary choice issue is how there has been a conscious 
decision to both make and buy certain products and services and the impact that this has upon 
building capabilities. Interestingly, the evidence for learning from suppliers was extremely 
limited. Certainly QMR suffered from many of the same issues as DHW in respect of their 
experiences with using the market, but even with an obvious understanding of the product or 
service (given they complete the activity internally as well) the interviewees did not mention 
suppliers in such cases as being a source of learning. The decision to buy seemed to be very 
much based on efficiency and budget constraints, whilst the decision to simultaneously make 
the product was required given the complex nature of the product and the fact that without 
this deep understanding of the process, QMR would be unable to manage the outsourcing 
contracts efficiently. There were certainly clear examples of QMR of choosing to do a project 
internally specifically to get some “hands-on experience” so that they could learn and build 
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this learning into their operations when more and more of this particular activity was being 
outsourced. 
It was in MRWA that intermediate governance modes were most obvious in the form 
of alliance contracting. These were used for the largest projects and could best be understood 
in terms of managing risk. They provide a degree of incentives for a range of outcomes that 
vary between the hard-to-motivate and the easy-to-motivate tasks, they can limit opportunism 
through quasi-hierarchical authority and simultaneously deliver a degree of autonomy beyond 
that experienced with a hierarchy (Dyer & Singh, 2008; Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Seibert, 
Silver & Randolph, 2004). 
In practice, these alliance contracts came at significant cost in that they were never 
established purely on the basis of efficiency and they purposefully incorporated a range of 
key performance indicators around knowledge transfer and learning. Some people physically 
moved out of the MRWA buildings and into the alliance partner’s offices for what could be a 
number of years and the financial uncertainty associated with these projects was significant 
given that the contract price was not determined until some way into the contract. Yet the 
results for MRWA have been very positive. Capabilities have clearly been developed.  As an 
example, there was a poor understanding of appropriate pavements with respect to certain 
geological conditions leading to the misspecification of pavement on a major regional road 
some years prior. Through involvement in some alliance contracts, knowledge concerning 
pavements has been developed and MRWA is now a significant contributor to the 
establishment of standards in this area for all Australian road providers. The greatest issue 
experienced by MRWA is how to take the new knowledge generated through the alliance 
contracts and diffuse it through appropriate parts of the organization to create broadly 
distributed capabilities. Individual that have been part of alliance contracts have clearly 
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benefited, however, such people are in the minority and therefore the recurring problem 
centers around effectively transferring the new skills and knowledge. 
Boundary Management 
The boundary choices that organizations made were only part of the story in respect of their 
ability to build new capabilities. What became obvious from the data was that were numerous 
examples of organizations making particular boundary choices that led to quite different 
outcomes. All of the cases presented examples of organizations using markets and hierarchies 
and occasionally both for essentially the same product or service (ie dual modes), yet there 
very varying levels of success in respect of learning and subsequent capability development.   
The first of the challenges for learning is the degree of embeddedness of the original 
knowledge and the absorptive capacity of the recipient. Knowledge is embedded in 
organizations to varying degrees. That which is largely tacit in nature and entrenched within a 
series of stories, myths and a dominant culture is more difficult to transfer without a 
comprehensive appreciation of the context of the knowledge (e.g. structure, processes and 
culture in which the knowledge is embedded) (Soo et al., 2002). This social context heavily 
influences the extent to which the other party’s skills are encodable and transferable (Hamel, 
1991).  
On the recipient side of the equation, the absorptive capacity or what Hamel (1991) 
refers to as receptivity which determines whether the knowledge can be internalized as a 
basis for new organizational routines. The ability to recognise, acquire and utilise new 
knowledge is itself a valuable resource (Garvin, 1993; Grant, 1996b). Organizations which 
have a rigid set of managerial beliefs which result in the inability or unwillingness to abandon 
or unlearn past practices will severely limit the effectiveness of organizational learning 
(Inkpen & Crossan, 1995). Hamel (1991) says that partners with the greatest need to learn 
often have the highest barriers to receptivity. If the knowledge gap is substantial, knowledge 
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transfer may be almost impossible. This may result in an inability to understand what the 
other party is doing, as well as not being able to understand the process leading to the other 
party’s knowledge development (Hamel 1991). Other key factors impacting receptivity are 
the personal skills of the individuals involved in the learning and often the need to unlearn as 
a precondition for receptivity (Hamel, 1991). 
Hamel (1991) also suggests that knowledge acquisition requires intent on the part of 
management in the form of an explicit learning agenda and considerable support by senior 
management. “Without clear corporate goals for competence building, and a deep 
appreciation for the critical contribution of core competence leadership to long-term 
competitiveness, individual businesses appeared unlikely to devote resource to the task of 
learning” (Hamel 1991).  
Finally, the knowledge must be internalized and integrated into firm routines. Except 
for cases where knowledge is clearly explicit, organizations need recognize that effective use 
of knowledge required its incorporation into the social systems of particular groups. Nonaka 
(1994) suggest internalization occurs when explicit knowledge is disseminated and become 
internalised by staff and adds to their existing tacit knowledge. This is characterised by 
“learning by doing” and occurs when this internalised knowledge is shared by most members 
of an organisation it becomes part of the organisational culture. 
From our data we were able to clearly discern the level of intent.  At DHW, there was 
a clear strategy (Review and Rebuild), but in terms of real action, this was limited to smaller 
initiatives built around such things as more extensive and formalized induction processes, 
training programs, links with other agencies and a more formalized review process (though 
this was not adhered to by either DHW employees or contractors). Contracts remained largely 
price-focused, there were no explicit knowledge transfer objectives incorporated into the 
contracts and there was no significant variation in respect of the organization’s boundary 
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choices. Given the data, it was difficult to discern the degree to which different knowledge 
sets were embedded. Invariably there would have been differences, but given we were most 
interested in the creation of new capabilities, there would have most likely been a 
combination of tacit and explicit knowledge.  
The receptivity of the organization was low as the extended program of outsourcing 
over a period of decades has left it with limited absorptive capacity in numerous areas. The 
culture of the for profit construction and consulting firms produce a very different culture, set 
of social systems and even language to the administratively dominated government funded 
DHW. And finally, in respect of internalization, there were few opportunities to share new 
knowledge and the project oriented nature of the work limited the level of reflection that even 
the project administrator could give to a completed project. 
In comparison, the level of intent was considerably stronger in the case of QMR. 
Some projects were purposefully undertaken internally to further develop knowledge in the 
area. This new knowledge may well have been embedded in various social structures, but as 
previously discussed learning seemed to occur more through the operation of hierarchy rather 
than when the same activity was undertaken through a market-based contract. Receptivity 
was high as QMR has always maintained a degree of activity in all key areas – even if the 
majority of the work is now outsourced. Many of the contractors they use feature numerous 
ex-QMR employees and the relationships certainly help in allowing knowledge to move more 
freely and support issues such as trust. QMR were particularly strong in the area of 
internalization.  There were very extensive communities of practice (covering seven major 
areas), informal systems to bring people together (including always putting multiple people 
of a project) and formalized communications that often served as a pre-curser for bringing 
people together to work together on an issue. 
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At MRWA the intent to rebuild capabilities was very clear – a new CEO with proven 
experience in this area, the establishment of alliance contracts that specifically incorporated a 
range of learning-oriented key performance indicators and significant financial support for 
initiatives that supported this goal. The embeddedness of knowledge was recognized as an 
issue and the structure of the alliance such that it involved ‘hands-on’ experience of the type 
seen in apprenticeship style situation aligns with Nonaka and Takeuchi's (1995) ideas 
concerning externalization. Similarly, the receptivity was enhanced through the alliance 
contracts as knowledge was developed in conjunction with the other party and there was no 
attempt to simply transfer it from one party to another at this point.  The main challenges 
MRWA have faced have been in internalizing the knowledge and here the social context and 
often tacit nature of the knowledge has made this difficult.  There has been some limited 
success via communities of practice and informal processes, but the formalized structures and 
information sharing have failed to extend much of the learning and new capabilities that have 
emerged from the alliance contract through the organization. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper presents different boundary choices (make, buy, intermediate governance modes 
and dual governance modes) and considers how such choices may potentially impact the 
(re)building of firm capabilities. Outside of the make option, all other governance modes 
provide particular pathways to capability development and we sought to investigate how 
these were used and their effectiveness across three construction oriented public sector 
organizations. What was perhaps most revealing were the results for the intermediate 
governance modes and the dual modes. In the case of dual modes, the decision to use the 
market for some production of a service or activity has been proffered as potential source of 
learning. “When a firm concurrently sources, learning will be enhanced, since it gains both 
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the deep tacit knowledge of internal production and the broader, more diverse understanding 
from external supply relationships” (Parmigiani, 2007: 292). For the purposes of building 
capabilities it seemed that the ‘deep tacit knowledge’ was key and the use of the market was 
done more for efficiency reasons and resource limitations (ie government dictated staff 
limitations) than for any logic concerning learning. In comparison, the choice of intermediate 
governance modes was undertaken specifically for the purposes of learning and the manner 
by which opportunism was limited through alliance contracts was something of a by-product 
of pursuing explicit learning goals. It was only through intermediate governance choices that 
new capabilities were able to be developed that were not generated internally. 
While boundary decisions were shown to be important determinants in the capability 
building process, this was only half of the story.  The other half of the process was about how 
the boundaries were actually managed. Considering dimensions such as intent, 
embeddedness, receptivity and internalization, it was clear that the same boundary choices 
may have different outcomes in-line with variations across these dimensions.  Interestingly, 
the boundary choice decisions are made by senior managers.  However, the boundary 
management processes are auctioned largely at middle management levels. Examples of 
communities of practice were seen in two organizations, yet these were not initially supported 
by top management and in one case, they survived their first years by their champions 
pursuing their agenda under a quality banner. Overall, firms were seen to make trade-offs in 
respect of economically efficient boundary choices and choices that may provide 
opportunities for capability development.  The success of firms following these sub-optimal 
boundary choices were, however, significantly tempered by the boundary management 
processes utilized by the organizations. 
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